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Abstract
The recent economic literature shows a new interest in the links between politics and economics. In
this paper, we join  Hibbs’ partisanship theory with the literature of fiscal policies international co-
ordination. Furthermore, by considering a monetary union context, we also open a new angle of
view in the recent debate on the effects of the European Monetary Union. In fact, by considering the
possibility of governments’ partisan behaviour, we analyse the possibility for governments of
internalising macroeconomic spillovers deriving from public expenditure at a national level and
investigate the interactions between fiscal and monetary authorities. This paper also partially
answers recent concern for considering multi-player contexts and asymmetries in open economy
analyses. Here, in fact, several kinds of co-operation and the effects of asymmetries in players'
preferences are studied (e.g. the asymmetries in the governments’ preference due to their
partisanship).
JEL codes: E62, E64, F15, F42.
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1. Introduction
As is well known, the theoretical framework joining policy objectives with government ideologies
is the partisan theory. Douglas Hibbs (1977, 1987) first formulated this theory in a very influential
article published in 1977 and in a successful book published ten years later. Hibbs (1977) contrasted
his partisan model to the political business cycle theory of  Nordhaus (1975). In fact, the
partisanship model emphasises the nature of the choice between alternatives presented in majority-
rule elections instead of a principal-agent problem between voters and elected public officials as in
the electoral business cycle models. The partisan theory of macroeconomic policy is based on the
idea that political parties weight nominal and real economic performance differently. Left-wing
governments are assumed to be more inclined than right-wing ones to pursue expansionary policies
designed to yield lower unemployment and higher growth, but running the risk of extra inflation
2.
The assumption of partisanship can be justified by the consequences of unemployment for
income distribution. In periods of high (low) unemployment, low (high) growth and low (high)
inflation the relative income of the upper-middle class increases (decreases). However, having
different preferences is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for observing the two parties act
differently when in office. In fact, in two-party elections, the candidates may converge toward the
middle in order to win the election: even a partisan politician cannot implement his desired policies
if he loses. A possible justification can be found in the uncertainty of electoral results. Parties trade
off the potential gain in probability of victory if they converge to the middle against the potential
loss in their preference dimension if they move away from their preferred position. We will not
explore the question of policy convergence in a two-party system with partisan policy-makers and
will stick to the original formulation
3.
In a recent article, Saint-Paul (1998) in fact underlines the strong link between policy objectives
and government ideologies. He analyses 40 changes in European employment-protection legislation
since 1960, classifying each one according to whether it was a step towards or away from more job
protection and according to whether it affected all workers or just a specific group. Ideology, not
surprisingly, plays a part: across-the-board reforms tend to happen under right-wing governments
just as targeted increases in protection are associated with left-wing governments. Similar empirical
studies are collected in Kreech (1995) for the United States and Alesina et al. (1997) for OECD
countries (see also Alvarez et. al. 1991; Franzese, 1999; and Oatley, 1999).
Detken and  Gärtner (1994);  Franzese (1996, 1999); and Di Bartolomeo (1999, 2001) have
opened a new strand by merging partisanship theory with the literature on central bank
independence and the labour market. However, these works mainly consider closed economy
contexts. In an open economy setting the problem of fiscal policy co-operation across national
boundaries arises. Fiscal policy co-operation may be founded on the existence of negative or
positive  spillovers. When there are negative  spillovers co-ordination leads to a reduction in
government expenditure, whereas positive spillovers imply increased government expenditure in
the co-ordinated case, if there is nominal inertia (see Mundell, 1968;  Hamada, 1985; Svensson,
1987; van der Ploeg, 1993). Dixon and Santoni (1997) have recently shown that positive spillovers
from government expenditure arise in a monetary union with unemployment, a fixed money supply
and unionised labour markets.  Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2001) have shown the limited
possibility of gains from fiscal policy co-operation across national boundaries in a game with an
active central bank whose pre-eminent objective is price stability and centralised wage setting.
These gains can be interpreted in terms of the partisan theory, as we do in this paper.
We use the simple model described in Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2001), which is referred to
only two countries, takes as constant some variables and assumes some kind of symmetry as
between the two countries.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the model; in section 3 non-
cooperative solutions are obtained. The effects of international fiscal policy co-ordination and co-
operation between fiscal and monetary authorities are examined in sections 4 and 5, respectively.
The final section presents a summary and conclusions.
2. The model
Three types of agents (firms, unions, and fiscal authorities) operate in each country and a single
central bank for the whole integrated area, which is a closed economy, sets the nominal interest rate,
r. Since there is perfect mobility of financial capital, the interest rate is the same in both countries.
Each country is specialised in the production of one good (or one basket of goods). Goods are
imperfect substitutes. There is perfect competition between firms within each country, but imperfect
competition as between firms operating in the two countries. Firms are profit  maximisers and
unions set monopoly wages in each country (if they do not act co-operatively) or for the whole area
(if they co-operate). Governments set the balanced budget level of public expenditure in each area
in a co-operative or non-co-operative way. Wages, budget levels and the interest rate are set
simultaneously.
Our baseline framework is an IS-AS model (see Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2001). The model
consists of two equations for each country. All variables are in logs.
ni = -s (r-p
e
i) + agi + bgj - t (pi - pj)  [1]
ni = (pi-wi)   [2]
nj = -s (r-p
e
j) + agj + bgi - t (pj - pi)  [3]
nj = (pj-wj)  [4]
vi = (1-h) pi + h pj    [5]
vj = (1-h) pj + h pi     [6]
where i and j denote the two countries, n is employment; p is the price of the composite commodity,
g is public expenditure, w is the wage rate, p
e is the expected inflation rate, v is the consumer price
index, or CPI. The expected rate of inflation is reasonably defined as E t-1 vt - vt-1. Furthermore,
perfect foresight and an initial price parametrically set equal to zero are assumed. Thus E t-1 vt = vt
and p
e = vt hold. Since our model is deterministic, the assumption of perfect foresight is equivalent
to that of rational expectations.
The two economies work in a symmetric way. Asymmetry in the working of the two economies
does not need to be stressed for the purposes of this paper. It can however be easily introduced. In
addition, a kind of asymmetry might arise because of possibly different preferences of unions and
governments (see eqns. [12] and [13] below),
Equation [1] and [2] represent IS and AS in country  i; equation [3] and [4] IS and AS in
country  j. Following recent literature, we take the nominal interest rate as the instrument of
monetary policy, as opposed to a monetary supply aggregate. This dispenses us with specifying a
money market equilibrium condition (i.e., an LM curve).
Demand is decreasing in the real interest rate (as an effect of the saving-investment behaviour by
the private sector) and the product prices differential (competitiveness effects on foreign trade). It
increases in home public expenditure and foreign public expenditure (exports). The latter is a
shortcut, with no loss of generality, to spillovers from country j to country i taking place through
country j’s imports. Equation [2] is a standard supply representation for profit-maximising firms.
Equations [5] and [6] define consumer price indexes. CPIs are weighted averages of prices of
domestic and foreign goods. h is a function of the degree of openness. As customary, we assume
h < ½.4
Solving the previous system of equations, we obtain the reduced form of the model:
ni = - A0 r + E1 gi + E2 gj - (1-A1) wi + A2 wj  [7]
vi = - A0 r + D1 gi + D2 gj + B1 wi + B2 wj    [8]
nj = - A0 r + E2 gi + E1 gj + A2 wi - (1-A1) wj  [9]
vj = - A0 r + D2 gi + D1 gj + B2 wi + B2 wj [10]
where: A 0=s/(1-s);  A1=(1-s+t+hs)/[(1-s)(1-s+2t+2hs)] >  A2=(t+hs)/[(1-s)(1-s+2t+2hs)];
A1 > B1=(1-h)A1+hA2 > B2=hA1+(1-h)A2 > 0; E1=(aA1+bA2) > E2=(aA2+bA1); D1=(1-h)E1+hE2 >
D2=hE1+(1-h)E2 > 0.
Parameters: A0, A1, A2, are the elasticities of the domestic price with respect to the nominal
interest rate, nominal domestic wage, nominal foreign wage, respectively. Therefore, (1+A0), (1-A1)
and (1-A2) are the elasticities of the real interest rate, the real domestic wage, the real foreign wage
rate with respect to the nominal interest rate, the nominal domestic wage and the nominal foreign
wage, respectively. In other words, for example, if the nominal interest rate increases by one point,
the real interest rate increases by 1 - (-A0) = 1 + A0, where 1 is the effect on the real interest rate of
the rise in the nominal interest rate and A0 is the effect of prices reduction (induced by the rise in the
nominal interest rate).
In this paper s˛(0,1) is reasonably assumed.
Five different regimes are possible according to the values of the two parameters hv = (1-B1) and
hp = (1-A1)
4. The former is the elasticity of the real wage to the nominal wage (when the real wage
is calculated on the basis of the CPI). The latter is the elasticity of the real wage (and employment,
since [2]  and [4] hold) to the nominal wage (when the real wage is calculated on the basis of
production prices).
When hv and hp are both positive, unions raise real wages by rising nominal wages at the cost of
a lower employment level (standard trade-off regime).
When hv is positive and hp is negative, unions benefit from a complementarity between real
wages and employment. This complementarity arises because of the wedge between the real wage
(calculated in terms of the CPI) relevant for the unions and the real wage (calculated in terms of
production prices) relevant for the firm (wage-wedge externality regime).
When hv and hp are both negative, by definition of these  elasticities, an increase in nominal
wages causes a more than proportional increase in v and p, and then a reduction in the real wage
both in terms of production prices and the CPI. In this regime unions can raise real wages by
reducing nominal wages. Employment however is still a decreasing function of real wages
(‘perverse’ trade-off regime).
When hp is equal to zero, nominal wage increases lead to proportional increases in production
prices, leaving the real wage rate (in terms of the latter variable) unchanged. Unions can thus pursue
only an objective of real wages (in terms of CPI) (fixed employment regime).
When hv is equal to zero, nominal wage increases lead to proportional increases in CPI, leaving
unchanged the real wage rate in terms of the latter variable. Unions could raise their satisfaction
only by raising the employment level which would compel them to set nominal wages at an extreme
value, in order to guarantee maximum employment (fixed real wage regime). This regime is thus of
no interest for our purposes
5.
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The reader should also note that government expenditure of each country has positive (negative)
spillovers on the employment (price) level of the other country.
We consider a simultaneous policy game between the central bank, national governments and
national unions. These players maximise the following utility functions:
( ) ( )
2 1
2
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where M is the utility function of the central bank, Sk and Uk are those of the government and the
union of the k country, respectively; nk
g and wk
u are government k’s and union  k’s bliss points,
respectively. According to Hibbs’ partisanship theory, we assume that right and left wing parties
have different opportunity cost of low inflation in terms of employment. We assume that a left wing
government is relativity adverse to the utility losses caused by a rise in the unemployment, whereas
a right wing government is relativity adverse to the utility losses caused by a rise in the inflation
rate. This is the standard assumption on which partisan theory models are based (see Alesina, 1988;
Hibbs 1992, 1993; and Di Bartolomeo, 2001).
Justifications for the use of the above preference functions can be found in the relevant literature
and, more specifically, in Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2001). We want here only to draw attention
on the fact that, even both governments attribute more importance to employment than to inflation
(which is stressed by the quadratic form of the former argument in the preference function), they
can put a different stress on this objective, if they have a different political orientation.
3. Non-co-operative solutions
Nash non-co-operative solutions are obtained by solving the system of equations derived from
agents’ maximisation problems. Each player maximises its preference function (equation [11] or
equation [12] or equation [13]) with respect to its control variable.
The following first order conditions refer to the solution of the central bank, the two unions and
the two governments problems, respectively:
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intermediate values of s˛(0,½), the wage-wedge externality regime holds (if h>0); the other two regimes occur when
switching from one regime to another. For more details on the regimes see Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2001:
Appendix B).6
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Expressions similar to [19], [20] and [21] hold for country j.
According to equation [19] and equation [20], a left-wing government obtains a better result in
terms of employment at the cost of a worse result in terms of inflation, and vice versa when a right-
wing party is considered. This result confirms that of Di Bartolomeo (2001) in a closed economy.
4. Fiscal policy co-operation
The central bank and unions maximisation problems are the same as those analysed in the above
section. Governments instead maximise the following common utility preference:
W = ½Si + ½Sj [22]
Solution of the governments’ problems yields the following FOCs:


























We obtain the equilibrium values of employment and the CPIs by solving the system ([14], [15],







































The values of gains from co-operation accruing to country i (in terms of the specific objectives
and not of satisfaction) can be obtained by subtracting the values of non-co-operative solutions from


































i = 0 [30]
Similar expressions hold for country j.
Co-operation has an effect on employment and consumer prices only if governments have
different objectives. In this case each government can exchange one objective for the other and
(presumably) raise its satisfaction level. The right-wing government can achieve a higher level of
employment when it co-operates with the left-wing government (since, in this case, it would share
the latter’s preferences, which are more employment-oriented), while the other  left-wing can
achieve a lower level of inflation, through international co-operation.
As pointed out in Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2001), the reaction of the central bank to any
attempt at a co-ordinated fiscal expansion of the economy (in order to preserve price stability)
completely neutralises the rise in total employment and prices induced by the governments’ action.
Only a redistribution of employment according to the relative preferences of the two governments
can take place, at the cost of higher inflation in the  country which improves the level of
employment (and with the benefit of a lower inflation in the other country). If these profess to the
same political credo (i.e., have an equal t), fiscal co-operation has no effect on employment or
inflation.
Contrary to conclusions drawn by Dixon and  Santoni (1997), positive  spillovers from
government expenditure no longer arise in a monetary union with an active central bank and equal
political orientation of governments.
5. Simultaneous co- -operation between central bank and governments
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Similar expressions hold for the other country.
Gains from co-operation between central bank and between governments are as follows:
( )
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These are the same outcomes derived in the case of government co-operation, except for the
inflation bias, which is reduced by the second term on the right hand side of [36].
Co- operation between the governments and the central bank can induce some gains in inflation,
but adds nothing to gains in employment that can be derived by the co-operation of governments
only. In particular, no rise in employment can be obtained by politically homologue governments
co-operating with the central bank.
6. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed the effects of international fiscal policy co-ordination and co-
ordination among fiscal and monetary authorities in a common-currency area.
In the non co-operative equilibrium, the standard proposition of monetary policy neutrality
holds. Furthermore, when partisanship is assumed, a standard result is obtained. A left-wing
government obtains a better result in terms of employment at the cost of a worse result in terms of
inflation, and vice versa when a right-wing party is considered.
However, when international fiscal policy co-ordination is introduced, the above result no longer
holds. In fact, in this case a right-wing government achieves a higher level of employment (but only
at the cost of higher inflation) when it co-operates with the left-wing government (since, in this
case, it would share the latter’s preferences, which are more employment-oriented), while a left-
wing government can achieve a lower level of inflation (at the cost of lower employment) if it co-
operates with a right-wing government.
Gains may then derive in terms of employment or inflation to one or the other country from
fiscal policy co-ordination between government having different political orientation.
Co-operation between the governments and the central bank can induce some gains in inflation,
but adds nothing to gains in employment that can be derived by the co-operation of governments
only. In particular, no rise in employment can be obtained by politically homologue governments
co-operating with the central bank.
The effects of fiscal policy co-ordination thus differ from those found by Dixon and Santoni
(1997), who claim the existence of across-boundaries positive  spillovers from government
expenditure. In the case of co-operation between governments the attempt to raise expenditure in
order to capture positive spillovers on the employment level is neutralised by the central bank
aiming at price stability. Any gain that can derive from co-operation is tied to the existence of a
plurality of political orientations in the monetary union. Neither a left-wing government nor a right-
wing one can have better results on, respectively, employment and inflation, by co-operating with a9
politically-homologue government. In addition, as one could expect, a government with a certain
political orientation can expect to gain by co-operating with a government having a different
political orientation only in terms of the variable (employment or inflation) it is less interested in
(and the other government is more interested in). This is so because co-operation means sharing the
partner’s objective.
When all the three public bodies (i.e., the central bank and the two governments) co-operate,
gains can only arise in terms of less inflation. Right-wing governments can then benefit from co-
operating with the central bank in a monetary union.10
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